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Until  2006,  trade  policy  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  had  mainly  been  focused  on 
multilateralism embraced by the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Meanwhile, the 
EU  maintained  an  effective  suspension  on  the  opening  of  bilateral  or  regional 
negotiations  where  their  increasing  number  was  considered  a  ‘spaghetti  bowl’  that 
creates problems for the international trading system. However, the suspension of the 
DDA negotiations in July 2006 forced the EU to reveal a new trade policy with the 
motto of “rejection of protectionism at home, accompanied by activism in creating open 
markets and fair conditions for trade abroad” which focuses on the removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade of goods and services. Consequently, the EU gave pace to 
signing  FTAs  with  its  significant  trade  partners.  This  new  trade  strategy  based  on 
increasing FTAs and thus on bilateralism, which aims at the highest possible degree of 
trade, investment, and services liberalization, targets regulatory convergence and the 
abolishment of non-tariff barriers beside stronger provisions on intellectual property 
rights and competition. This paper discusses whether the new trade strategy of the EU 
leads to a distraction of the EU’s trade policy focus from multilateralism to bilateralism 
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Introduction 
Following the temporary suspension of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), in October 2006, the European Commission (EC) 
revealed a new trade policy strategy under which the EU will pursue bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with targeted economies in order to secure new markets and protect 
or  enhance  competitiveness  for  European  businesses.  This  new  strategy  was  a 
significant shift from the EC’s de facto moratorium of any bilateral agreements and 
expressing loyalty to multilateral trade policy focus of the WTO. This change in the 
trade policy strategy raised concerns about the completion of the DDA and the future of 
the multilateral trading system, as the biggest proponent of multilateralism shifted its 
attention to bilateralism. 
This  paper  aims  to  analyze  the  evolution,  motives  and  main  characteristics  of  the 
European  Union  (EU)’s  external  trade  policy  and  the  possible  consequences  of  the 
adoption  of  the  new  trade  strategy  on  the  further  progress  of  the  WTO-based 
multilateral  trading  system.  Section  2  explains  the  historical  stance  of  the  EU  on 
bilateralism  and  multilateralism,  and  its  previous  trade  policy  strategy.  Section  3 
analyzes the post-Doha international trade environment and the new trade policy of the 
EU. Section 4 examines the trade relations of the EU with the countries the European 
Commission is either negotiating an FTA or set a target to pursue one. Concluding 
remarks  discuss  how  this  policy  shift  of  the  EU  might  influence  the  fate  of  the 
multilateral trading system. 
Evolution of the EU’s Trade Policies 
Regionalism through Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs)  has  been  widely  discussed  among  trade  economists  since  the  1950s.  In  the 
pioneering theoretical approach on the subject, Viner (1950) introduced the concepts 
‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ and stressed the discriminatory aspects of regional 
trade liberalization. His claim was that, bilateral or regional economic integration can 
create trade by lowering tariffs and thereby reducing prices, but it can also lead to trade 
diversion for the countries outside the trade agreement. Thus, regional or bilateral trade 
agreements  increase  the  exports  of  the  signatory  countries  at  the  expense  of  third 
countries.  
The formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and European 
Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA)  in  1960  became  the  first  remarkable  examples  of 
regional trade agreements. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US was keeping a 
multilateralist  approach  to  trade  liberalization,  based  on  the  negotiated  rules  of  the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While Europe was integrating in the 
1960s and 70s, the US was rejecting proposals for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area 
(Panagariya,  1999,  p.  481).  Thus,  since  the  1980s,  RTAs  were  mostly  limited  to 
Western  Europe  and  regionalism  was  mainly  a  ‘European’  concept.  According  to 
Bhagwati (1993), “the first wave of regionalism that took place in the 1960s failed to 
spread  because  the  US  supported  a  multilateral  approach.”  Following  Bhagwati’s 
terminology, the ‘second wave of regionalism’ started after the failure of the GATT 
multilateral trade negotiations in November 1982, whereas this time the US changed its 
position  and  favored  RTAs.  This  regionalism  wave  affected  both  developed  and 
developing countries and led to the formation of several regional groupings including International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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the  EU,  NAFTA  and  Mercosur.  Hence  the  EU,  itself  an  example  of  a  regional 
integration, has been an early promoter of regional trade agreements, and the 1970s and 
the  1990s  witnessed  several  preferential  trade  agreements  of  the  EU  with  different 
countries. 
However,  in  the  mid  1990s,  the  EU  turned  its  attention  to  multilateralism.  The 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994, and the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995 to provide the institutional support to the multilateral 
trade  agreements,  flourished  the  expectations  that  a  world  trading  system  based  on 
common rules and multilateral liberalization can be formed. There was an expectation 
that “exceptions to multilateralism, such as regional trade agreements (...) would either 
become less of an alternative policy option for countries or will need to be adapted and 
conducted in such a manner as to become outward-oriented, not inward-looking, and 
thus constitute building blocks for the new multilateralism ushered in by the WTO.”  
(Mashayekhi et al., 2005, p. 3) EU’s steer towards multilateralism was reinforced when 
Romano  Prodi,  the  president  of  the  EC,  appointed  Pascal  Lamy  as  the  European 
Commissioner for Trade in 1999. Lamy was a strict proponent of multilateralism and 
during his period as the Commissioner, the EU maintained an effective suspension on 
the opening of bilateral or regional negotiations to conclude FTAs, and championed the 
multilateral trading system. Lamy (2002) explained this policy as one “pursu[ing] all 
existing mandates for regional negotiations with vigour and fairness, but not to begin 
any new negotiations”. (p. 1412) This trade strategy was based on two reasons: first, it 
favored the multilateral approach of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and the EU 
did not want to take any initiative that might detract from its completion; and second, 
the EU had a ‘deep integration’ approach in FTAs and these agreements were complex 
and time-consuming to negotiate (Lamy, 2002, pp. 1412-1413). Increasing the number 
of bilateral agreements has been labeled as ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping trade rules 
that erode the principle of non-discrimination and raise the transaction costs of doing 
business, and was assumed to complicate the international trading system as a whole.  
The  EU  had  announced  its  strict  loyalty  to  the  completion  of  a  comprehensive 
multilateral  round  of  the  WTO,  but  certain  developments  were  creating  some 
disturbances in this trade policy stance. The first development was that, the US had 
started to pursue an activist FTA policy based on ‘competitive liberalization’ after the 
Bush Administration had restored the Fast Track Negotiating Authority (also known as 
the Trade Promotion Authority) in 2002, which had expired and not been in effect since 
1994. With the Authority, the US saw an opportunity to catch up with the EU’s long 
record of pursuing preferential agreements (CRS, 2006) and started FTA negotiations 
with several countries including Chile, Singapore, Australia and Morocco. Second, the 
DDA,  which  was  set  to  conclude  in  December  2006,  started  to  show  significant 
slowdown in progress towards multilateral liberalization. Especially after the Cancun 
talks collapsed in 2003, and three of the ‘Singapore issues’
1 dropped down from the 
DDA in 2004, the wisdom of multilateralism started to be questioned in the EU. Even 
Lamy argued, in the Trade Policy Assessment document that summarizes his five-year 
term as the Trade Commissioner, that, “our arguments in favour of a better regulated 
multilateral world have been less effective. Indeed, arguably as a result, trade policy or 
the  WTO  has  too  often  been  the  sole  focus  for  efforts  to  strengthen  international 
                                                 
1  Singapore  issues  are;  investment  protection,  competition  policy,  transparency  in  government 
procurement and trade facilitation. On 1 August 2004, WTO members agreed to start negotiations on 
trade facilitation, but not on the other three Singapore issues.  International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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governance, which risks weakening its legitimacy both internally within the Union, and 
in the outside world. I don’t believe the WTO can or should remain the sole island of 
governance in a sea of unregulated globalization.” (European Commission, 2004, p. 5) 
Lamy had stuck to his initial policy of keeping the moratorium on FTAs during his 
service in the Commission, but he also had given the first signs of a probable change in 
the EU trade policy. 
New Trade Policy of the EU: Focus on FTAs 
In July 2006, negotiation talks in Geneva failed to reach an agreement and the DDA was 
officially  suspended.  This  development  threw  multilateralism  into  a  bleak  future. 
Regarding the fact that the biggest competitor, the US, has been pursuing FTAs with 
many countries, especially with developed and emerging markets in East Asia, the EU 
had to act as soon as possible to avoid trade diversion and a shift in the EU’s trade 
strategy had already become inevitable. With the suspension of the DDA, multilateralist 
position of the EU has lost its ground and the Commission has been forced to change its 
trade policy focus. 
The European Commission revealed a new trade policy strategy in October 2006, under 
which the EU would pursue bilateral FTAs with major economies in order to secure the 
market access and competitiveness of European companies in important markets. The 
core of the new trade strategy of the EU has been summarized by the Commission as; 
“rejection of protectionism at home, accompanied by activism in creating open markets 
and fair conditions for trade abroad” (European Commission, 2006).   
The new trade policy strategy primarily focuses on the need to identify and remove 
tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to market access for goods and services that are 
important for the European exporters. With the FTAs, the Commission also aims to 
solve  some  behind-the-border  issues,  especially  the  Singapore  issues  of  investment 
protection,  competition  policy,  and  transparency  in  government  procurement,  which 
cannot be tackled by the DDA. The new trade policy strategy report also revealed an 
agenda  aiming  to  influence  the  forces  driving  change,  to  seize  the  opportunities  of 
globalization and to manage the risks and challenges posed by the emerging economies 
especially in Asia and South America.  
The FTA strategy constitutes a very important part of this trade policy. The EU already 
has quite a large number of bilateral deals: the agreements with the EFTA countries, the 
customs union with Turkey, the goods agreements with the Euromed countries and the 
preferential arrangements offered to the sub-Saharan  African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries. The EU had also signed FTAs with Chile, Mexico and South Africa. 
Furthermore, as the recent developments in the world trade system made it necessary for 
the  EU  to  enhance  its  access  to  new  markets  in  order  to  protect  and  improve 
competitiveness  of  European  business,  the  Commission  defined  economic  criteria, 
target countries and coverage for future FTAs. 
The European Commission defines the key economic criteria for new FTA partners as 
market  potential  and  the  level  of  protection  (tariffs  and  NTBs)  against  EU  export 
interests. In this sense, the Commission defines ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur as prior 
FTA partners, and India, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council as countries of direct 
interest. China, on the other hand, despite meeting many of the criteria, is not defined as International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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a possible FTA partner, but a country of special attention because of the opportunities 
and the risks it presents (European Commission, 2006, pp. 10-11). The EU's new FTA 
strategy  aims  at  the  highest  possible  degree  of  trade,  investment,  and  services 
liberalization, in addition to a ban on export taxes and quantitative import restrictions. 
The main targets are regulatory convergence, non-tariff barriers and stronger provisions 
on intellectual property rights (IPRs) and competition. These trade relations could also 
include incorporating new cooperative provisions in areas relating to labor standards 
and environmental protection. In this sense, the EU would also have to take the erosion 
of  its  existing  trade  preferences  into  account  when  negotiating  FTAs,  which  could 
translate into sheltering certain products from tariff cuts (ICTSD, 2006).  
The trade policy change in the EU raised the concerns that the EU was shifting its 
attention from the WTO to bilateral agreements, and the revival of the DDA would 
become more difficult. Although the strategy report clearly states that “there will be no 
European retreat from multilateralism and the EU remains committed to the WTO” 
(European  Commission,  2006,  p.  10),  the  rising  number  of  FTA  negotiations  and 
proposals in the years after the policy shift keeps these concerns alive. 
After the announcement of its new FTA strategy, the EU has instantly given pace to its 
efforts for signing FTAs. Currently, the following can be listed as the key EU bilateral 
agreements: 
•  Economic Partnership Agreements in negotiation with ACP countries (Cotonou) 
•  Free Trade Agreements with EFTA, EEA, Euromed, Mercosur (in negotiation), 
Mexico, Chile and South Africa 
•  Customs Unions with Turkey, Andorra and San Marino 
•  Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and Ukraine 
As  stated  in  the  strategy  paper,  primarily  targeted  FTA  partners  were  ASEAN  and 
Korea, and negotiations with both of them started in May 2007. Following them, FTA 
talks  with  another  important  economy  in  Asia,  with  India,  started  in  June  2007.  In 
addition, the EU accelerated the FTA talks that had started before the policy change, but 
had been suspended because of the EU’s multilateralist position (e.g. FTA negotiations 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Mercosur). The EU is also seeking to 
negotiate FTA agreements with Russia and the Andean and Central American countries. 
There are also FTA proposals to the EU from several countries including Japan and 
Pakistan.  In  the  appendix,  we  display  summarized  tables  for  the  trade  indicators 
(amounts and shares of exports and imports) of the EU with its target FTA partners and 
those  for  the  previous  FTA  partners  from  2000  to  2006.  The  numbers  evidence  an 
increasing  trend  for  each  country  and  country  group  (such  as  ASEAN  and 
MERCOSUR) in both export shares and import shares of the EU. 
Motives Behind the EU’s Free Trade Agreements 
In this section we will explore the trade relations of the EU with the countries that it is 
negotiating or seeking for an FTA. We begin with an examination of the broader picture 
showing on which grounds and motives the EU has pursued bilateral trade agreements 
so far. Then we exemplify the motives and the possible gains from potential bilateral 
agreements  with  Korea,  ASEAN  and  India  with  which  the  EU  has  already  started 
negotiations. International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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According  to  Woolcock  (2007),  the  EU’s  framework  of  bilateral  and  regional  trade 
agreements can be differentiated into two main motives; foreign policy and security, 
and commercial interests. Political motivations were dominant in EU’s trade agreements 
related to its neighborhood policy, including the Europe Agreements with the Central 
and  Eastern  European  countries,  the  Euro-Med  Association  Agreements  with 
Mediterranean  countries,  and  the  Stability  Pact  with  the  countries  of  the  Western 
Balkans.  The  commercial  or  economic  motivations  for  economic  partnership 
agreements or FTAs, on the other hand,  primarily focus on limiting or neutralizing 
potential  trade  diversionary  effects  which  result  from  FTAs  concluded  between 
important trading partners and a third country. The prime example of neutralizing trade 
diversion through an FTA is the EU–Mexico FTA, motivated by a desire to neutralize 
trade diversion after the conclusion of NAFTA. Commercial motivations also include 
forging strategic links with countries or regions experiencing rapid economic growth, 
and enforcement of international trade rules. 
Regarding  the  current  FTAs  of  the  EU,  we  observe  that  commercial  or  economic 
interests  are  the  dominant  motivations.  Neutralizing  trade  diversion  motive  can  be 
observed  in  all  FTA  negotiations  that  started  in  the  new  trade  policy  environment. 
ASEAN, Korea and India had already been approached by the US, and the EU needed 
to pursue FTAs with these important markets as soon as possible in order to avoid 
diversion of the imports of these countries from Europe to the US.  
Some research has been done on the trade potential of these countries (such as Korea, 
ASEAN and India) in the context of bilateral trade agreements. One of these studies 
belongs to Kim and Lee (2004), who examine the trade potential capacity of the EU and 
Korea  using  the  gravity  model  approach.  A  simple  gravity  equation  embodies  the 
‘normal’  patterns  of  bilateral  trade  by  integrating  the  economic,  geographical  and 
cultural factors. Frankel (1997) argues that if actual trade volume is higher than the 
normal level of trade that is obtained from the gravity factors (economic, geographical 
and  cultural),  then  intra-regional  trade  bias  occurs.  Kim  and  Lee  employ  a  gravity 
equation analysis which intends to estimate the trade potential capability of Korea and 
the EU-15. Constructing two models, one for estimating separately the gravity equations 
for 52 countries between 1980 and 2002, and another for estimating the normal pattern 
of bilateral relations in the world, the authors first find that there is a noticeable degree 
of over-trade between the EU-15 and Korea. Another point the paper reveals is that this 
over-trading is a result of the fact that “Korea has enjoyed a higher ratio of openness in 
terms  of  the  ratio  of the  trade  volume  with  respect  to  GDP”  (Kim  and  Lee,  2004, 
p.147).  Second, when Korea and its trade with the world are considered, the EU-Korea 
trade is found to be under-traded, pointing to the possible explanation that Korea’s trade 
volume  with  the  EU  is  much  less  than  its  trade  performance  with  its  other  trading 
partners. Another paper of Kim (2005) emphasizes that an FTA with Korea would be 
desirable for the EU because the structural EU trade deficit since the 1990s is usually 
attributed to the problems EU companies and products encounter while entering and 
operating in the Korean market. These problems create barriers to trade as the Korean 
rules  for  both  products  and  services  differ  from  those  of  the  EU.  Hence,  an  FTA 
between the EU and Korea is expected to be advantageous for the EU especially if it 
succeeds in removing the trade barriers, adoption of the EU standards for goods and 
services and strong cooperation. Besides, as Korea is one of the most dynamic emerging 
markets in East Asia, the EU finds it much beneficial to build an economic basis in 
Korea, where an FTA would effectuate the role (Kim, 2005, p. 10). International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Regarding the relations between the EU and ASEAN which date back to 1980, we can 
start  with  the  first  EU-ASEAN  agreement  that  was  concluded  in  the  form  of  a 
cooperation agreement. It was a declaration of good will and intentions and contained 
some basic principles about trade. Although this initiation developed a political dialogue 
between the EU and ASEAN, it was not able to prioritize closer and deeper relations. In 
the 1990s, the two partners engaged in a significant effort to deepen the cooperation and 
encourage greater contact. However, the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis impeded the 
relations once more. After the recovery from the effects of the crisis, in 2001 and 2003, 
the EU attempted to vitalize its relations in Southeast Asia and classified ASEAN as a 
key economic and political partner. The following priorities were designated for the 
relations with the Southeast Asia (Moeller, 2007): 
• Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; 
• Promote human rights, democratic principles and good governance in all aspects of 
EC policy dialogue and development cooperation; 
•  Dialogue  incorporating  issues  such  as  migration,  trafficking  in  humans,  money 
laundering, piracy, organized crime and drugs; 
• Invest dynamism by launching a trade action plan called Transregional EU-ASEAN 
Trade Initiative (TREATI); 
• Support the development of less prosperous countries; 
• Intensify dialogue in specific policy areas. 
These  priorities  constitute  a  well-established  ground  for  the  EU  to  stimulate  a 
cooperative environment in Southeast Asia. Moeller (2007) points to two long term and 
far-reaching benefits for EU-ASEAN relations arising from an FTA: first, it will please 
them both in Asian integration; and second, an FTA will enhance their ability to tackle 
non-conventional and common threats to stability and security (Moeller, 2007, p. 478). 
 Theoretically,  these  two  benefits  may  be  gained  without  an  FTA,  but  the  political 
environment calls for one. Since ASEAN has already concluded or is negotiating FTAs 
with so many other partners, it seems difficult to solidify EU-ASEAN relations without 
such an agreement. According to Moeller (2007), for ASEAN, “an FTA with the EU 
may provide a platform for adjusting the competitive position of member states, making 
them more capable of carving out a platform for competing with Asia's two giants: 
China and India” (Moeller, 2007, p. 479). Since most ASEAN countries can no longer 
compete on costs, they are in need of gaining competitive characteristics in areas such 
as corporate governance, legal system, protection of intellectual property rights, design, 
quality,  performance.  As  long  as  some  of  these  issues  are  not  covered  by  the 
international set of trade rules under the WTO, a considerable number of countries seek 
a solution through FTAs. What is more, an EU-ASEAN FTA will confirm the belief 
that  the  two  partners  trust  each  other  and  their  intention  to  deepen  and  spread 
cooperation into other areas. One such area is supposed to be transnational security 
issues. Therefore, in case the EU and ASEAN fail to achieve enhanced cooperation in 
trade and economics, “dealing with more complex issues such as security issues will be 
impossible” (Moeller, 2007, p. 479). International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Botezatu (2007) also handles the circumstances of an EU-ASEAN FTA as a question of 
‘when’ rather than ‘whether’. She emphasizes that the EU and Southeast Asia share 
many common interests and features in the sense that they both seek ground for deeper 
integration between their own member states and they are both embedded in multilateral 
trade relations in the multi-polar world. Here arises another common situation for them 
which results from the shortcomings of the multilateral system. Politically, they reflect 
their will on creating a more effective multilateralism through cooperation in a wider 
range of issues besides trade such as development aid, economic assistance and non-
military security cooperation. Since there is a huge development gap between ASEAN’s 
rich and poor members, financial aid from the EU and hence a bilateral agreement is 
considered an opportunity that should not be missed. In terms of trade relations, the 
strong commercial links between these two blocs confirm the necessity. The EU was 
ASEAN’s  third  largest  trading  partner  as  of  2007.  Similarly,  ASEAN  is  of  crucial 
economic  importance  for  the  EU.  Cooperation  on  environmental  issues  such  as  the 
Kyoto Protocol and dialogue on migration are also common aspirations of the two trade 
partners. Taking these into consideration, Botezatu concludes that the establishment of a 
free trade area between the EU and ASEAN will certainly welcome important economic 
benefits that will support and expand the European model of integration among ASEAN 
countries. 
Finally,  the  EU  started  negotiations  with  India  on  a  bilateral  trade  and  investment 
agreement on 28 June 2007. Before, the Council had adopted a negotiating Directive for 
an FTA with India on 23 April 2007, together with negotiating Directives for an EU-
ASEAN and an EU-Korea FTA
2. India is trying to adhere to a ‘grand leap forward’ 
liberalization  model
3,  which  targets  to  improve  its  manufacturing  exports  and 
information technologies, and aims to ease its access to foreign markets. Having already 
become an important production base and outsourcing destination for EU companies, 
India is in the target of the EU who aims to get access to the large  Indian market, 
increase its investment and the export of goods and services, and settle on favorable 
trade rules and regulations. The bilateral FTA is supposed to prepare the ground for a 
‘strategic partnership’ in trade and investment. Polaski et al. (2008) employ a simulation 
analysis using the social accounting matrices of India and the EU and find the possible 
effects  of  an  FTA  on  the  EU.  According  to  the  analysis,  all  the  macroeconomic 
indicators  of  the  EU,  such  as  private  consumption,  government  consumption, 
investment consumption, import demand, export supply and total domestic production, 
display significant increases. For instance, export supply appears to increase by 1.35 
billion dollars corresponding to a 0.05 % change, whereas import demand is found to 
increase  by  3.21  billion  dollars  which  corresponds  to  a  0.11%  rise.  Similarly,  total 
domestic production is expected to increase by 0.05% as a result of the simulations. 
To sum up, reasons for bilateral trade agreements other than commercial motivations 
have started to come to the fore as multilateral trade has encountered some obstacles 
and as solutions to these obstacles can only be sought through FTAs between individual 
partners.  The  EU  has  adopted  itself  to  evaluate  the  best  strategy  with  its  potential 
partners in order to deepen integration, expand its share in world exports, incorporate 
dialogue  on  universal  issues  such  as  migration  and  environment  and  promote  good 
governance and development cooperation. 
                                                 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/india/index_en.htm 
3 This strategy is announced by the Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India 
at http://commerce.nic.in/index.asp. International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Conclusion 
The  European  Community  (later  the  European  Union)  has  been  a  landmark  for 
regionalism. By promoting its own model of regional integration throughout Europe and 
its neighboring countries, the EC/EU aimed to enhance its reach to different markets. 
Nevertheless, it also supported the multilateral trade liberalization of the GATT/WTO, 
albeit not as loyal as the US. In the late 1990s, the EU shifted its attention entirely to the 
completion  of  multilateral  WTO  negotiations  and  put  a  moratorium  to  all  bilateral 
agreement talks. However, the collapse of the WTO negotiations in Cancun in 2003, 
proliferation of FTA negotiations by the US, and finally the suspension of the DDA in 
July 2006 forced the EU to pursue bilateral FTAs in order to protect the competitiveness 
of European businesses.  
The shift of the trade policy focus of the EU from multilateralism to bilateralism raised 
concerns about the future of the WTO. Although the strategy paper of the new trade 
policy clearly expressed that there will be no European retreat from multilateralism and 
the EU is still loyal to WTO principles, the question still remains: will it be feasible (or 
even necessary) to revive the DDA after concluding several FTAs?  
There is a significant difference between the ‘new generation’ FTAs of the EU and its 
previous bilateral trade agreements and the European integration scheme. Former FTAs 
were mainly concluded with neighboring states or former colonies and the essential 
motives behind those FTAs were dominantly foreign policy and enlargement. The new 
trade  policy  of  the  EU,  on  the  other  hand,  puts  a  strong  emphasis  on  economic 
arguments by linking FTAs to purely economic criteria, such as the market potential of 
the  partner  and  the  existing  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  to  EU  exports.  Having 
completed the economic integration in almost entire Europe and its neighborhood, the 
EU  now  targets  the  emerging  economies  in  Asia  and  Latin  America.  Another 
noteworthy  characteristic of the new  generation FTAs is that, in the absence of the 
WTO negotiations, the EU sees these FTAs as an opportunity to negotiate regulatory 
and beyond-the-border issues that are not included in the DDA, and also to deal with 
‘tough’  issues  like  agriculture,  which  seems  almost  impossible  to  solve  in  the 
multilateral talks. Relying upon these motivations, surveyed research on the potential 
consequences of FTAs between the EU and selected countries evidence the gains from 
increasing free trade and cooperation. 
We argue that, although both the US and the EU express that they are still loyal to 
multilateralism, the recent surge of FTAs makes the revival of the DDA more difficult. 
As major trade partners achieve their goals in increasing bilateral trade by removing the 
trade barriers, the marginal gains from the results of multilateral negotiations diminish. 
Currently, it seems that multilateralism is losing its ground against bilateralism. The 
hopes for agreeing on multilateral free trade based on common WTO rules seem to be 
fading away, but this does not mean that ‘free trade’ is weakening; bilateralism and 
FTAs became the new tools of globalization and free trade. As for the Doha Round, as 
the Trade Minister of  India, Kamal  Nath said,  “the round is not dead, but between 
intensive care and the crematorium”, and two years after the suspension of the talks, we 
can say that each FTA makes the DDA one step closer to the crematorium. 
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Appendix 
All sources: Authors’ calculations from COMTRADE (2008) 
Table A.1. Exports of the EU with Target FTA Partners (millions $) 
   ASEAN  MERCOSUR  S. Korea  India  China  Russia  GCC 
2000  37.724  21.935  15.064  12.368  23.512  20.353  27.314 
2001  38.482  21.702  13.895  11.175  27.086  27.569  30.508 
2002  37.768  17.257  16.322  12.444  32.669  31.962  33.744 
2003  43.457  17.345  18.185  16.107  46.024  41.390  42.115 
2004  53.330  22.844  22.190  21.181  59.932  56.999  51.073 
2005  55.844  25.644  24.998  26.215  64.310  70.081  62.579 
2006  61.939  29.656  28.783  30.447  80.219  92.311  70.002 
 
Table A.2. Share in EU's Total Exports (%) 
   ASEAN  MERCOSUR  S. Korea  India  China  Russia  GCC 
2000  4,75  2,76  1,90  1,56  2,96  2,56  3,44 
2001  4,79  2,70  1,73  1,39  3,37  3,43  3,79 
2002  4,41  2,02  1,91  1,45  3,82  3,73  3,94 
2003  4,34  1,73  1,82  1,61  4,60  4,14  4,21 
2004  4,43  1,90  1,84  1,76  4,98  4,73  4,24 
2005  4,20  1,93  1,88  1,97  4,84  5,28  4,71 
2006  4,15  1,99  1,93  2,04  5,37  6,18  4,69 
 
Table A.3. Imports of the EU with Target FTA Partners (millions $) 
   ASEAN  MERCOSUR  S. Korea  India  China  Russia  GCC 
2000  64.034  22.638  24.591  11.804  68.316  48.922  20.914 
2001  59.043  23.021  20.566  11.977  72.739  48.141  17.794 
2002  63.896  23.715  22.830  12.802  84.576  50.648  17.379 
2003  74.283  29.173  29.074  15.788  119.048  66.394  22.832 
2004  85.913  35.269  37.650  20.185  158.488  100.384  31.759 
2005  87.907  37.928  41.292  23.480  196.335  132.631  46.405 
2006  103.951  44.402  58.323  29.034  284.954  149.713  46.418 
 
Table A.4. Share in EU's Total Imports (%) 
   ASEAN  MERCOSUR  S. Korea  India  China  Russia  GCC 
2000  6,96  2,46  2,67  1,28  7,42  5,32  2,27 
2001  6,70  2,61  2,33  1,36  8,25  5,46  2,02 
2002  7,17  2,66  2,56  1,44  9,49  5,68  1,95 
2003  6,98  2,74  2,73  1,48  11,18  6,24  2,14 
2004  6,69  2,75  2,93  1,57  12,35  7,82  2,47 
2005  6,01  2,59  2,83  1,61  13,43  9,07  3,17 
2006  5,94  2,54  3,33  1,66  16,29  8,56  2,65 
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Table A.5. Exports of the EU with Previous FTA Partners (millions $) 
   Chile  Mexico  S. Africa 
2000  3.161  12.991  10.725 
2001  3.283  13.565  11.034 
2002  2.951  14.306  11.475 
2003  3.293  16.078  15.032 
2004  3.878  18.289  19.953 
2005  4.827  20.816  22.448 
2006  5.363  23.952  25.529 
 
Table A.6. Share in EU's Total Exports (%) 
   Chile  Mexico  S. Africa 
2000  0,40  1,64  1,35 
2001  0,41  1,69  1,37 
2002  0,34  1,67  1,34 
2003  0,33  1,61  1,50 
2004  0,32  1,52  1,66 
2005  0,36  1,57  1,69 
2006  0,36  1,60  1,71 
 
Table A.7. Imports of the EU with Previous FTA Partners (millions $) 
   Chile  Mexico  S. Africa 
2000  4.680  6.707  13.328 
2001  4.546  6.825  14.218 
2002  4.568  6.151  14.224 
2003  5.566  7.333  16.745 
2004  8.962  8.545  19.614 
2005  9.767  11.163  20.779 
2006  15.548  13.768  23.180 
 
Table A.8. Share in EU's Total Imports (%) 
   Chile  Mexico  S. Africa 
2000  0,51  0,73  1,45 
2001  0,52  0,77  1,61 
2002  0,51  0,69  1,60 
2003  0,52  0,69  1,57 
2004  0,70  0,67  1,53 
2005  0,67  0,76  1,42 
2006  0,89  0,79  1,32 
 
 
 